Donbass and the freedom to write what you want

With the sound of a coffee machine at the background, we started our first interview with a local journalist, working in here since the start of the conflict. After the usual introductionairy questions we asked her the obvious question about freedom of press in the Donetsk People’s Republic: why don’t you dare to show your face on camera?

NL: http://blikopnosjournaal.blogspot.nl/2017/05/persvrijheid-donbass-deel-3.html

The airplane’s delay gave us only ten minutes to spare to get into our train, we found a replacement for the coach we would be traveling in when we arrived in Rostov. Everything went just fine until now, the most essential part of the trip: the border crossing with the DNR. Despite all the positive experiences with Russia the last year, the Russian stereotype of security officials saying “NJET!” was very much alive. The atmosphere was tense, would this be the moment that all the hard work of the last four months of preparation would prove in vain? The guard looked and he joked to his colleague: “Look they are worried! Better rattle your handcuffs.” – The joke broke the ice. Strange how relaxing that sound could be while waiting at a Russian border post. We were unaware how much trouble we were getting ourselves into at that very moment. Yet, just as much, we did not fully realize how much trouble we were being saved.

In 2015, a group of independent American and Lebanese journalists, would arrive in Donetsk. They were behind schedule, and such, were only left with three days to make their reports from Donetsk. A local journalist, Helga Green, met them. She recalls the meeting: “They travelled through Ukraine. First they came to Kiev.” And talking about their journey into Donbass: “They told me that, when they revealed their interest in visiting rebellious territories, they met with deep resentment on the part of the Ukrainian authorities.” The delay being caused by the subsequent ‘good deal of red tape and hindrances’ left them short on time. She adds “That is why most reporters come via Rostov.”

The story which surprised me most was that of Oxana Chelysheva, a journalist that has been living in exile fearing to return to her home country Russia. Not being able to travel via Russia, she had to take the Ukraine-route. If anything, I have would expected a Russian dissident to be gladly given passage by a country which so much struggles against ‘Russian aggression’, yet ironically, she writes: “While I could have been in Donetsk, all westerners went to Donetsk via the Russian Federation.”

Such stories played a large role in deciding to take the more expensive, more complicated, and longer route via Moscow, Rostov and finally Donetsk.* Yet, the route via the Russian-steppe, was met with much resent from people with strong mistrust in Russia and some western journalists alike. The former were sure to point out, rather fanatically, that by traveling to ‘Ukraine’s occupied territories’ via Russia, we were in fact violating the law. The above-mentioned journalists in turn looked at the route with much suspicion. Why travel via Russia, when you could travel via Ukraine? Indeed, even months after returning to the Netherlands, a major Dutch newspaper would still write about our chosen route with distrust: “Instead of traveling to rebel held area via Ukraine, like almost all journalists do, the two would choose a route via Russia.” (1)

 

Photo: Michel Spekkers

Back to the café: a pseudonym: “Elena”, and a picture of back of her head – that’s all you, as my reader, will have to make due. This was the reality of the DNR, she did not dare to show her face in fear of repercussions to her family. Elena was born and raised in Donetsk and now works there a journalist. She is employed in for a big news organisation in Russia. “In Ukraine live my close relatives”, she replies when asked why she did not want to show her face. “I am simply scared that if I will show my face and people will see this report that my family will get into trouble. They might be summoned by the SBU (Ukrainian secret service), interrogated. I do not want there to problems for them because of that.”

There is another reason for preferring to stay anonymous, she remains to be a citizen of Ukraine. “I would not like to travel over there and that they would hold me and say, here, we made up some kind of article about separatism and terrorism and would imprison me.”

Another journalist we talked to is Katya Katina. She tells us she wanted to enlist in the local militia, but instead of fighting, the former model was asked to make reports about the conflict. She was confronted that she does show her face, and was asked why other journalist do not want to reveal their identities. She thinks it might be because they might have families in Ukraine. “When I have interviews with soldiers in the DPR-army, the same problem.” She explains. “Lots of them have parents, they have families, they have on the Ukrainian territory and of course it is just a question of safety.”

“There are a lot of examples”, Elena tells us about journalists working in Donbass, but having problems in Ukrainian controlled territory. “There is in Ukraine a site called ‘Mirotvorjets’, they publish all information about all journalists and their relatives with passports, birthdates… And people, who have relatives over there, are being lured to come to Ukraine such that he can be imprisoned by pressuring their families.”

Snapshow of Mirotvorjets, this page shows the profile of Vladislav Zelenyj, foto of passport and adress included.

Katina gives a similar account when asked what might happen with soldiers or journalists if they reveal the identity. “Well I think SBU can take their parents or the wives and so on, you know they have all these inquiries.” She gives an example of what happened to a soldier some time ago: “We know already that such situations happened, when some soldier showed his face and the next day SBU guys came and they even took the families to the prison. So everything can happen, so people think about the safety of their relatives.”

While listening to the recording of the interview with Elena, one cannot help but notice how often we have asked her if she felt safe in Donetsk. But she keeps answering the same: she does feel safe to do her work here. She explains that she might receive comments, for example if she did not understood and reported something not completely correct. “But”, she says, “forbidding me to write something, that does not happen. I did not hear about such cases. Maybe it happened with other journalists, but personally, I did not hear about it.” It seems as if western prejudice of what is supposed to be happening in Donbass fades only slowly. “So you feel free to do your job?” we asked, as if checking that we did not hear something incorrectly, yet Elena again repeats herself: “In general, yes.”

 

 

* Another reason was that it was unclear whether Ukraine would choose to arrest me. As loyal readers know [link], I have visited Crimea the summer before by traveling there via Russia. The sentence for entering ‘Ukraine’s occupied territories’ illegally, could mount up to five years of jail time.

1 – De Volkskrant, 13 mei 2017, “Voor het karretje van de Russen”, by Bert Assink and Gerben van den Noorda.

 

Disinformation as a Weapon in Hybrid Warfare

A recently held talk given in The Hague gives insight in the way Russian media, press statements and other forms of information, are perceived in the west. Among the speakers part of the conference was Mark Laity, Chief Strategic Communications (1) at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). His talk gives insight in how Russian’s press statements and media strategy are perceived in NATO.

‘Disinformation is launched for a reason, it has a goal’, says Marc Laity, Chief Strategic Communications at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) at NATO. ‘Hence, publishing of a certain piece of information is linked to a certain event and made to influence certain players.’

To explain the Russian view of information warfare, Mister Laity refers to a well-known article written by General of the (Russian) army, Valery Gerasimov. Laity places stress on the fact that ‘Information Conflict’ is placed in between the non-military and military measures and stretches from the beginning of a conflict to its end. Hence the ‘information conflict’ is being fought if only a potential military threat is present. “We needs to stop thinking that there is war and there is peace.”, Laity concludes from this. “Informational confrontation does not a ‘pre’ to an invasion, but is a permanent state.”

As an example of the working of Russian disinformation Laity uses the recent publishing of radar data by the Russian government. While the Dutch Joint Investigation Team (JIT) just published its report claiming the responsibility of a separatist operated BUK-system. The Russian released radar images allegedly shows that the missile could not have been fired from the site indicated by the JIT. The result is that anyone viewing the events at home is puzzled what account to believe.

A similar example is giving about Crimea. Initially president Putin said that the soldiers appearing from nowhere all over Crimea were not Russian. However, at a later moment in time he would admit that, indeed these men were Russian soldiers. The result of initial denial is that western powers, not knowing who these soldiers are. Because western countries do not possess a picture of what exactly is happening, they are to postpone their reaction until it is too late.

The above cases are used by Laity to demonstrate that parties are paralyzed by the multitude of information. For example, governments do not know what is going on and therefore incapable of taking serious measures. While at home, using the mistrust in governments, one might lead to discredit the fact in total, not being able to know what is true and what is not. Resulting in a reaction, as Laity put it, “God, I do not know! Stuff it!”

‘So what is NATO doing?’ was a reaction from the audience. ‘Does NATO have a counter strategy?’ Laity responds by saying that there are insufficient resources at a tactical level. To demonstrate this Laity refers to supposedly Russian ‘troll farms’, organizations in Russia solely dedicated to making comments on forums and spreading pro-Russian information. ‘Russia has a clear idea what to do, but in the West we do not’. Laity adds that before NATO formulates any strategy, NATO should have a clear idea what the Russian strategy actually is.

The moderator of the conference adds an interesting remark to Laity’s strategy. He states that Russia’s attempt to influence public opinion is a 24h industry and that the West is insufficient in combatting this. Adding that ‘We in the west only come up with propaganda on a project basis like in Iraq.’ This last remark put into perspective some of Laity’s words. Indeed, the west also makes use of propaganda and while discussing Russia’s attempt of ‘disinformation’ this is often forgotten. When certain information of Russian origin is referred to as disinformation does not automatically make it as such. Indeed the Chief of Strategic Communications at SHAPE, might well have his own reason to spin certain information in a certain way. While discussing Russia’s information strategy, Laity suggested that much Russian information is incorrect. While in fact (if not the vast majority), a significant part of information of Russian origin is different information (but true), and from a different perspective.

1 – https://nl.linkedin.com/in/mark-laity-b6b86b6

https://twitter.com/marklaity

Russia now recognises passports from DNR and LNR (EN/NL)

When talking about Donbass only seldom does one hear how people’s lives are affected by that the countries they live in are not recognised. The recent recognition by Russia of passports and other documents published in Donbass looks like at a step forward for many living in the area. This article searches to describe some of the effects of the recent decision by the Russian Federation (RF). The article further attempts to describe the geo-political context in which RF has made her decision.

Voor Tekst in Nederlands, zie onder.

Look at a map anywhere in the world, and one would see that the territories of Donbass are part of Ukraine. However, Ukraine has little to say what is happening in the territories controlled by the DNR and LNR: these are de-facto independent countries, with its own police, own government and own documents. But these documents are handed out by a country no other country in the world recognises. The recent signing of a presidential decree by Russian president Putin changes this situation, at least in Russia.

Before the decree many people in the DLNR* were dependent on to their Ukrainian passports. Without them it is impossible to travel abroad to, say Russia. If one does not possess a Ukrainian passport because one might have lost it in the course of the war, one cannot leave the country. The dependency on a Ukrainian passport is even bigger when one realises that many people chose not to travel domestically when going to the Ukrainian controlled territory. Evgenia van Amerongen, a manager working at a bus company, explains the difficulties:

 “One needs to make the crossing via the line of separation (between Donbass and Ukraine – SB), the crossing goes via checkpoint of DNR/LNR and Ukraine. All these posts are located in ‘hot areas’. For example Zaitsevo, Marinka, Stantisija Luganskaya.”

Because a large number of people want to avoid risking their lives they chose to travel via Russia and hence need a Ukrainian travel document. This situation changes now the Russian Federation has decided to recognise passports from the Donbass, even letting residents from the Donbass travel without the need of a visa.

“If a child is born in the LNR, how does one receive a birth certificate?” Van Amerongen adds continuing on documents which are not recognised. “The parents need to go to Ukraine and provide a document from the hospital where the child was born. But the hospitals are in the LNR and Ukraine does not recognise these documents. Hence, there is a child, but it does not exist juridically.”  There are similar situations when someone dies: a Ukrainian citizen that dies in Donbass, might judicially live forever. Though the Presidential decree does not change anything about the situation in Ukraine, it does help to deal with associated legal issues in the Russian Federation.

A similar situation exists for students. Just two weeks ago students studying in Lugansk or Donetsk were never assured whether the degree for which they are learning would ever be worth something. Only recently the ministry of education of the RF temporarily recognized diplomas from the DLNR*. This previous measure still puts students in limbo whether their diplomas would recognized the next year. “Before certificates of education were recognized by Russian universities, due to a decree of the Ministry of education.” Sana Samoylenko, a student at the University of Lugansk explains. “the decree was be signed for a year, so every next year the Ministry of education would extend it.” The new decree removes this doubt. Samoylenko: “Now students are assured that their certificates of education will be accepted, without fear that the previous decree of Ministry of education does not extend.”

Next to educational papers, vehicle registration papers are also accepted from the DLNR.

Geopolitical context

It goes without a doubt that Russia’s decision to recognise documents from the DLNR will not be welcomed in the west. Indeed, Ukrainian President Poroshenko has gone so far as to say that the decision ‘is proof for Russia’s occupation of the Donbass.‘

Though, the presidential decree by no means is a recognition of the DNR and LNR. (The decree refers to them as ‘territories of the separated regions of the Donetsk and Lugansk Oblats of Ukraine: «территории отдельных районов Донецкой и Луганской областей Украины») But, nonetheless, the Russian Federation will have understood that the decision should have counted on little sympathy and understanding from the western world.

The decision comes days after a tweet written by Donald Trump on Wednesday. In this tweet Trump states that Crimea was taken by Russia from Ukraine.

The tweet follows a statement made by US press secretary Sean Spicer a day earlier. According to Spicer “President Trump has made it very clear that he expects the Russian government to deescalate violence in the Ukraine and return Crimea.”

Russian Federation’s Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Maria Zakharova answered these statements by saying on Wednesday that “We do not return our territories. Crimea is a territory of the Russian Federation. – That’s all.”

Later die week, on Saturday, Putin would sign the above mentioned decree, recognizing all associated documents upon signing the decree. The following Monday Dmitri Peskov, spokesperson of the Russian President would explain the signing as a humanitarian gesture. Pointing to regular blockades of the rebel-controlled areas by Ukraine.

The timing of the measure seems to indicate that the measure is intended (amongst others) as a signal to the Trump administration that RF will not give back Crimea, nor will it cease its help towards the Donbass. Rather, quite the contrary, Russia might even intensifies its bonds with Donbass when Washington questions Moscow’s territorial claims.

But whatever underlying motives, and whatever opinions diplomats might have on Russia’s recent decision, for those living in Donbass Russia’s recognition of DLNR papers will somewhat ease their lives.

*DLNR : Abbreviation for Donetsk and Lugansk People’s republics.

Rusland erkent nu paspoorten uit de DNR en de LNR

Wanneer er wordt gesproken over Donbass wordt er maar zelden genoemd hoe mensen hun levens worden beïnvloed doordat hun land niet is erkent. De recente erkenning van Rusland van paspoorten en andere documenten uit Donbass lijkt een stap voorwaarts te zijn voor velen die in het gebied wonen. Dit artikel hoopt een aantal effecten te beschrijven van de recente beslissing van de Russische Federatie (RF).  Ver hoopt dit artikel een geo-politieke achtergrond te geven waarin de RF haar beslissing heeft genomen.

Kijk naar een kaart op een willekeurige plaats in de wereld en je ziet dat Donbass een onderdeel is van Oekraïne. Echter, Oekraïne heeft maar weinig invloed in de gebieden die gecontroleerd worden door de DNR en LNR: het zijn in feite onafhankelijke landen met haar eigen politie, overheid en haar eigen documenten. Maar deze documenten zijn uitgegeven door een land dat geen enkel ander land in de wereld erkent. Het recente ondertekenen van een presidentiele verordening van de Russische president Putin veranderd deze situatie, althans in Rusland.

Voor de verordening waren veel mensen in de DLNR* afhankelijk van hun Oekraïnse paspoorten. Zonder deze paspoorten was het onmogelijk om naar het buitenland te reizen, naar Rusland bijvoorbeeld. Als men niet beschikte over een Oekraïens paspoort omdat men het tijdens de burgeroorlog kwijt was geraakt, kon men de DLNR niet uit. De afhankelijkheid van een Oekraïens paspoorts is zelfs nog groter als men bedenkt dat veel mensen er voor kiezen niet intern gaan het door Oekraïne gecontroleerd territorium te reizen. Evgenia van Amerongen, een manager die werkt voor een busbedrijf, legt de moeilijkheden uit:

“Men moet de oversteek maken via de scheidingslijn (tussen Donbass en Oekraïne – SB), de oversteekt verloopt via een controle post van de DNR/LNR en Oekraïne. Al deze controle posten bevinden zich en ‘instabiele gebieden.’ Bijvoorbeeld Zaitsevo, Marinka, Stantisija Luganskaya.”

Omdat een grote hoeveelheid mensen hun leven niet willen riskeren, kiezen ze ervoor te reizen via Rusland en dus hebben ze een Oekraïens reisdocument nodig. De situatie is veranderd nu de Russische Federatie besloten heeft paspoorten uit Donbas te erkennen, inwoners uit Donbas kunnen zelfs reizen zonder visum.

“Als een kind is geboren in de LNR, hoe kan men dan een geboorteakte krijgen?”, voegt Van Amerongen, sprekende over de niet erkende documenten, toe. “De ouders moeten naar Oekraïne en daar documenten laten zien van het ziekenhuis waar het kind is geboren. Maar de ziekenhuizen bevinden zich in de LNR en Oekraïne erkent deze documenten niets. Dus, er bestaat een kind, maar juridisch bestaat het niet.” Een soortgelijke situatie bestaat als iemand komt te overlijden: een Oekraïense burger die sterft in Donbass, kan juridisch voor altijd blijven doorleven. Hoewel de presidentiele verordening niets veranderd aan de situatie in Oekraïne, helpt het wel om te gaan met de geassocieerde juridische zaken in de Russische Federatie.

Een soort gelijke situatie bestaat onder studenten. Slechts twee week geleden waren studenten die studeerden in Lugansk of Donetsk er nooit van verzekerd of de graad waarvoor zij leerden ooit iets waard zou zijn. Slechte recentelijk heeft het ministerie van onderwijs van de RF tijdelijk diploma’s uit de DLNR erkent. Maar deze maatregel gaf studenten nog geen duidelijkheid of de diploma’s ook het volgende jaar nog erkent zouden zijn. “Voorheen waren onderwijs certificaten erkent door Russische Universiteiten, dmv een verordening van het ministerie van onderwijs.” Legt Sana Samoylenko uit, een student aan de Universiteit van Lugansk. “De verordening was ondertekent voor een jaar, dus ieder komend jaar zou het ministerie van onderwijs het moeten vernieuwen.” De nieuwe verordening haalt deze twijfel weg. Samoylenko: “Nu zijn studenten ervan verzekerd dat hun certificaten worden geaccepteerd, zonder de angst dat de vorige verordening van het ministerie van onderwijs niet zou worden voortgezet.”

Naast onderwijs certificaten, worden voertuig registratie uit de DLNR nu ook geaccepteerd in Rusland.

Geopolitieke Context

Het behoeft geen betoog dat Rusland heft beslissing om documenten uit de DLNR niet welkom worden geheten in het westen. De Oekraïense president Poroshenko heeft zich al uitgelaten dat de beslissing van Rusland “bewijs is van Rusland haar bezetting van de Donbass.”

Hoewel de presidentiele verordening geen erkenning is van de DNR of de LNR. (De verordening refereert naar hun als ‘het territorium van de afgescheiden regio’s van de Donetsk en Lugansk oblasts van Oekraïne.) Toch, moet de RF hebben begrepen op maar weinig sympathie kon rekenen vanuit de westerse wereld.

De beslissing voor erkenning komt slechts dagen naar een tweet die geschreven is door Donald Trump of woensdag. In deze tweet schrijft Trump dat de Krim door Rusland is afgepakt van Oekraïne.

https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/831846101179314177

De tweet volgt een verklaring die eerder die dag is gemaakt door Sean Spicer. Volgens Spicer: “President Trump heeft het heel duidelijk gemaakt dat hij verwacht dat de Russische overheid het geweld in Oekraïne de-escaleert en de Krim terug geeft.”

De woordvoerder van het Russisch ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Maria Zakharova, beantwoorde deze verklaring door op woensdag te zeggen dat “We geven ons territorium niet terug. Krim is een territorium van de Russische Federatie. – Dat is alles.”

Later in die week, op zaterdag, ondertekende Poetin de eerder genoemde verordening die alle geassocieerde documenten erkent zodra de verordening is ondertekend. De daarop volgende maandag heeft Dmitri Peskov, woordvoerder van de Russische President, de verordening uitgelegd als een humanitair gebaar. Wijzende op de reguliere blokkades van het door rebellen gecontroleerd gebied in Oekraïne.

De timing van de maatregel lijkt te wijzen dat de maatregel o.a. bedoeld is om een signaal te geven naar de Trump administratie dat de RF de Krim niet zal terug geven, noch zal het haar hulp naar Donbas stoppen. Daarvoor in de plaats het tegenovergestelde, Rusland intensifieert haar banden met Donbas toen Washinton Moscow territoriale grenzen in twijfel stelde.

Wat de onderliggende motieven ook mogen zijn, en wat de diplomaten ook mogen vinden van Rusland haar recente beslissing, voor degenen die leven in Donbas, zal Rusland haar erkenning van DLNR documenten, hun levens iets makkelijker maken.

*DLNR : Een afkorting voor de Volksrepublieken Donetsk en Lugansk.

Sources

http://www.kp.ru/daily/26645.5/3664228/

http://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/15/politics/trump-crimea-russia-twitter-obama/

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-ukraine-idUSKBN15T2IY

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/kremlin-defends-recognition-ukraine-rebel-passports-45606674

https://www.rt.com/news/378032-peskov-passports-ukraine-east/

Reflections on Russia’s flotilla in Syria.

On the day that the world was in awe due to Donald Trump’s victory over Hillary Clinton, Russia’s navy flotilla reached the shores of Syria. The timing of the flotilla’s arrival might have very well been made a reaction to Hillary’s possible election to office.

Russian minister of Defence Sergej Shoigu on the 21^st of September that Russia’s Aircraft Carrier Admiral Kuzentsov will move towards Syria, arriving there in the middle of November.(1) It was announced that the Carrier would be accompanied by at least 5 ships and several support vessels.

Two months later it has became clear that the Naval group consists of the aircraft carring missile cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov, the nuclear battle cruiser Pyot Velikij, Two Udaloy class destroyers (Severomorsk, Vice-Admiral Kulakov) and the Admiral Grigorovich corvet (Project 11356P/M) and several support ships. It is been assumed though not confirmed that several attack submarines will also accompany the flotila. A further two destroyers, an Additional Udaloy class and a Sovremeny class destroyer of the passific fleet might join with the task force on a later date.(2)

Infographic via Southfront

A2AD

The concision of the arrival of the fleet with the elections should not be deemed an accident. Many analysts agreed that Hillary Clinton would indeed win the presidential elections in the United States. Both Clinton’s work as Secretary of State, as well as her campaign, have made not shown many promises for cooperation with Russia over Syria to put it mildly.

With Clinton’s election, it would have become clear what the US’s foreign policy would have been in the next four years. This would allow the current (Obama) administration to already start deploying a naval taskforce to the area to start or prepare a possibly military involvement in Syria. If such a mission would be executed it might well prove a repetition of the campaign in Libia, de facto destabilizing the region.

However, with the deployment of the Russian naval task force to the area such a US mission would become significantly more difficult diplomatically and militarily. In view of the timing the main reason for the naval task force her deployment therefore seems to be Anti Access / Area Denial (A2AD.)

Subsequent Tasking

Another important mission of the naval grouping is the usage of the carrier at all. The usage of the Kuzentsov in Syria will mark a premiere in Russian maritime history for being the first time a Russian carrier is deployed to a war zone. The experiences gained during the upcoming missions will prove useful in the development of future carrier design. Russia has very recently announced it will start designing its own supercarrier(1) and several helicopter carriers.(3)

One should not expect a Kuznetsov fighters to fly deep into Syrian territory (unless supported by aerial tankers). This is first and foremost due to Kuznetsov’s design. Since fighters take of via ramp instead of a catapult like US fighters do. Consequently, their weight must be limited forcing the fighters to limit their fuel and hence their operational range. Therefore, it is much cheaper to carry out bombing missions from the Russian airbase in Latakia. Most likely fighters will be involved in missions around Hama, possibly Aleppo.

However, aircraft will not be the only way of striking targets in Syria. It is expected that the attached submarines will also carry out strike with Kalibr-M missiles on ground targets in Syria.

Concluding

In view of Clinton’s failure to win the presidential elections, the US-Russia relations over Syria might in fact calm down. If Trump holds by his word to further cooperate with the Russian Federation over Syria, the deployment of the Russian flotilla might therefore be of only limited duration. Never the less the usage of the carrier will be used to subsequently developpe future Russian carrier projects.

 

More info on the Admiral Kuzenetsov can be found in this article of The Duran, found in the link bellow. The article deals amongst others about claims of Kuznetsov being outdated:
http://theduran.com/russia-deploys-kuznetsov-aircraft-carrier-to-defend-syrian-coast/

 

Credit for Pictures:
Admiral Kuznetsov: Russian Ministry of Defence
http://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/forces/navy/associations/structure/forces/type/navy/north/flagship.htm
Inforgrafic: Southfront militairy analysis.
https://southfront.org/admiral-kuznetsov-battlegroup-to-start-active-phase-of-operation-in-syria-in-coming-days-reports/

1 – https://www.rt.com/news/360178-russia-carrier-syria-kuznetsov/

2 – https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2016/10/22/the-russian-navys-great-mediterranean-show-of-force/

3 – http://theduran.com/russia-build-helicopter-carriers-replace-french-mistrals/

What ís Happening in Crimea (4/5)

Several pictures for your amusement, made this summer in Yalta, Simferopol and Sevastopol.

In Russia paratrooper day is being celibrated throughout the country. One the day, which marks the anniversary of the establishment of the VDV – The Russian paratroopers, it is tradition to wear the paratrooper out and wave the VDV flag. And, despite it is officially banned, to dance in fountains. Just like in other parts of Russia, paratrooper day is also celibrated in Simferopol.

Above, two picture containing graffiti. The First one reads ‘Crimea is Ukrainian’, the second ‘Crimea is Russia.’ Despite the graffiti, the overwhelming sound heard is that Crimea is considered part of Russia. On government buildings the Russian flag can be seen. And despite it still makes claim to the territory, the Ukrainian government has very little to say what happens there. – Picture taken in Simferopol.

A very famous comment made by former Ukranian prime-minister Yatsenyuk, was the “It is our Crimea, it is our Yalta, it is our sea, it is our territory, Vladimir Vladimirovich (Putin)!” (bellow)

A lot of jokes have already been made about this. Like the following two videos:

Nevertheless, the following picture, depicting an advertisement of a carrental company in Yalta, is new to me. It states “Crimea is YOURS!”

In the above picture we can see two billboards for the political Party: United Russia – the party to which Putin and Medvedev also belong. The one on the left says “OUR CRIMEAN SAVCHENKO” and the one on the left is about the “The Building of the Kerch bridge”, stating: “ACTING IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE IS OUR WORK!”

Here another picture of an advertisement of United Russia, using the popularity of Vladimir Putin.

Above, two memorial sites. The first one might suprise most. It is a memorial in Sevastopol about the war fought by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The one bellow, also in Sevastopol, depicts all the hero cities in the former Soviet Union.

The above picture is a memory to Andrej Brazhevskij that died in a fire in a building of the local union in Odessa. The fire resulted in the deaths of dozens of people that were fleeing from far rightwing demonstrators that came to prevent the demonstration of pro-Russian demonstrators. The Odessa fire is faous throughout Russian speaking world as a symbol of far-right extremism in Ukraine. Even worse is that the pupertraitors of the fire have never been convicted nor tried.

Another intersting fact is that the the graffiti has been over painted, painted again (tekst hand written to the left), and again over painted. It shows that, at least in sub-cultures there is still resistance to the Russian set of ideas. – Picture taken in Simferopol.

Above the Boulevard in Yalta. The McDonalds, which has been closed, either because of company policy or due to sanctions has been completely built in a wall of all kinds of carnaval rides. To the left, a wallpainting can be see depicting Vladimir Putin and the newest Russian fightjet, the Sukhoi T50.

An enlargement of the same picture in Yalta. In the bottom right it says ‘#OURS’, refering to that Crimea is now part of Russia.

Above a sign about where to find information about departures of autobusses in Sevastopol. There is however a less pleasant sticker: “White boys Simferopol” an organisation, most likely neo-nazi.

In the above picture a popular way of advertising. Papers posted on posts and walls. There are three things being offered her. First is judicial help. The other, I think, are more interesting. One is an ad to travel to Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov (all safely in Ukraine) but also to Donetsk and Lugansk. The other is for services connecting to the migration card, a card every foreigner should carry with him visiting Russia. Both ads show that there is still much contact with Ukraine and more so, with the regions of Donetsk and Lugansk, despite the civil war raging there.

A final word about history. Only few in Europe know something about the role Russia, as part of the Soviet Union, played in the Second World War. Fewer still know about the heroic defence of the city of Sevastopol. For months, the city held out against one of the most able of German generals. The only way to resuply the city was by boat. But despite its heroic defence the city would fall. Nevertheless, so impressive was its defence that the city of Sevastopol would be awarded the titel ‘Hero City.’ And for all those sailing into its harbour today are reminded by a huge statue commemorating those that kept the city safe for so long. In honor to those that fought, this memorial and a link to a documentary about the battles fought in Crimea in World War II.

Storm in the East: The Defence of Sevastopol